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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT
Street Vendor Project v. City of New York'
(decided August 23, 2007)
The Street Vendor Project of the Urban Justice Center sued
the City of New York, through the chairperson of the Environmental
Control Board ("ECB"), for increasing fines for violating New York
City Health and other Administrative Codes.2 The lawsuit was filed
on behalf of 300 licensed and unlicensed street vendors "who sell
food and merchandise" on New York City streets.3 The plaintiffs
claimed the fines were arbitrary, capricious, and in violation of the
Excessive Fines Clause of both the United States Constitution and the
New York State Constitution.4 The street vendors also contended
1 Street Vendor Project v. City of New York (Street Vendor Project I1), 841 N.Y.S.2d 79
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 2007).
2 Street Vendor Project v. City of New York (Street Vendor Project 1), 811 N.Y.S.2d 555,
557 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2005). See Lynda Richardson, Public Lives; A Graduate of Law
School and the Burrito Cart, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004, at B2. The Street Vendor Project is
an organization under the nonprofit Urban Justice Center. It was founded in 2001 by Sean
Basinski, who graduated Georgetown Law School in 2001 after a short stint as a New York
City Street vendor. The project was initially financed as a "shoestring operation" with
$15,000 from Yale. Members, numbering approximately 200, pay $100 in annual fees and
are given tape measures and cameras to collect evidence in case of future problems with the
police. Id.
3 Street VendorProjectI, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("Excessive
bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punish-
ments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained."); Street Vendor Project I,
811 N.Y.S.2d at 557. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 276 n.22 (1989) ("We shall not decide whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion on excessive fines applies to the several States through the Fourteenth Amendment ...
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that the increased fines violated the City Administrative Procedure
Act ("CAPA") because the City failed to provide them with proper
"notice of its intent to implement the [fine] increases." 5 However, the
city argued that the violations were not as extensive as the street ven-
dors had asserted, 6 and that the fines served an important governmen-
tal function in decreasing recidivism rates for regulatory violations.7
The court found the record before it insufficient to balance the factors
necessary to conduct an excessive fines, gross disproportionality
analysis, but held the plaintiffs could raise the issue in future law-
suits.
8
This dispute between the street vendors and New York City
began when the ECB initiated a proposed revision of its fines sche-
dule regulating street vending on July 17, 2003. 9 Under this new
proposal, "the penalties for the first and second violations within a
24-month period were to be doubled; the penalty for a third violation
was increased to $250; and the penalty for a fourth, or subsequent vi-
olation, was raised to $1,000. ' ' 1° What made these penalty increases
so egregious, according to the street vendors, was that
[i]n comparison to the schedule of fines that had been
5 Street Vendor Project , 811 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
6 Id. ("[T]he City represents that, for implementation of the escalating fine schedule for
repeat offenses, all violations by a vendor cited on a given date are treated as one.").
7 Thomas I. Lueck, New Schedule of Higher Fines Stirs Protest of Street Vendors, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2005, at B6 (A spokeswoman for the Department of Consumer Affairs
stated that "[t]he only way to send a clear signal to repeat violators is to step up the penalties
each time there's a violation .... to protect legitimate businesses, both store owners and
law-abiding vendors").
8 Street Vendor Project II, 841 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
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in use for the preceding 20 years . . .the Schedule
doubles the fines for the first and second violations,
and increases the penalties for the third violation from
$100 to $250, for the fourth violation from $250 to
$500, for the fifth from $250 to $750, and for the sixth
and subsequent violations from $250 to $1,000.11
Upon learning of the city's intent to increase fines for street
vending violations, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction
and declaratory relief against the city. 12 The plaintiffs argued they
did not have proper notice of the increased fine schedule because "the
City failed to publish a notice of the proposed rule thirty days prior in
the City Record, announc[ing] the purpose of the proposed rule, soli-
cit[ing] written comments, hold[ing] a public hearing, [and] pro-
vid[ing] notice to the City Council, news media, and Community
Boards." 13 New York County Supreme Court Justice Carol Edmead
enjoined the city from enforcing the July 2003 increases, and like-
wise estopped the city from denying vending licenses for failure to
pay the increased fines. 14 After winning on the injunction issue, the
plaintiffs further moved for the court to certify the affected street
" Id. at 558. "[T]he old fine structure provided for a low level of fines that was ... a cost
of doing business.., that did not deter subsequent violations." Id. at 558 n. 1.
12 Ousmane v. City of New York, No. 04-402648, 2005 WL 1004738, at *2 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County Apr. 13, 2005).
[O]n August 11, 2003, Sean Basinski, Director of the Urban Justice Cen-
ter ("UJC") Street Vendor Project, was informed by the ALJ [Adminis-
trative Law Judge] during an ECB hearing that violation penalties for
street vendors had increased .... The street vendors state that they did
not know about the rule change at the time it was effected, and that ...




14 Id. at *3.
2008] 413
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vendors as a class of plaintiffs. 15 Justice Edmead held that "[t]hese
vendors, aggrieved by the City's failure to notify them of a penalty
increase that would inflict great hardship upon them and their ability
to pursue a life in this country, are entitled to relief in one swift
stroke." 16 Despite the city's arguments, the court limited the class to
vendors who had received Notices of Violation between July 17,
2003 and October 4, 2004. "
Shortly after Justice Edmead issued her decision in favor of
the plaintiffs on the preliminary injunction and class action issues,, 8
the ECB "adopted the subject schedule of fines . . . [on April 21,
2005] and caused it to be published in the City Record on June 20,
15 Id. at *4. The street vendors argued: (1) joinder of the approximately 12,000 licensed
street vendors is impracticable; (2) "there are questions of law or fact common to the class";
(3) "the claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class"; (4) the
UJC's "extensive experience representing marginalized communities" shows that its repre-
sentation of the street vendors will ensure "fair[] and adequate[] protect[ion] [of] the inter-
ests of the class"; and (5) "a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy" given the relatively small individual claims
and "lack... [of] financial resources to bring suit individually." Id. at *5.
16 Ousmane, 2005 WL 1004738, at *12. The court held the plaintiffs had met the first
four prerequisites for a class action given
the numerosity of the proposed class, the predominance of common
questions of law and fact among the claims of the proposed class mem-
bers which derive from the same conduct of the City, the typicality of
their claim to the claims of the proposed class members, and the adequa-
cy of representation.
Id. at *9. Regarding the fifth requirement, however, the found it "cognizant that where gov-
ernment operations are involved, and where subsequent petitioners will be adequately pro-
tected under the principles of stare decisis, the 'government operations rule' applies so as to
preclude class action certification." Id.
7 Id. at *13. "[T]he City's position [is] that the class be limited so as to exclude those
proposed members who failed to exhaust administrative remedies within 30 days of the mail-
ing of the ECB's determinations." Id. Justice Edmead described her ruling as "about the
American Dream. . . . You can't put it in the air and not live behind it." Nina Bernstein,
Court Rules In Vendor's Favor, Declaring a Fine Increase Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29,
2004, at B I.
18 See Ousmane, 2005 WL 1004738, at *1. Justice Edmead's decision was issued on
April 13, 2005.
4
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2005." 19 The plaintiffs then instituted an Article 78 proceeding in
addition to a separate motion for a preliminary injunction to chal-
lenge the city's adoption of these increased fines.2 Justice Michael
D. Stallman held for the Supreme Court of New York County that the
ECB's notice of the increased penalty schedule was defective be-
cause the information it contained inadequately disclosed the under-
lying motivation or purpose of the rule, but held a newspaper publica-
tion could cure the defect.21 In accordance with its decision on the
notice issue, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction as moot.22 The appellate division affirmed under an abuse
of discretion standard of review, 23 enunciating the New York test for
identifying an excessive fine as "whether the fine 'is grossly dispro-
portional to the gravity of a defendant's offense.' ,,24 It is "a sui ge-
neris inquiry turning on a myriad of factors, including the seriousness
of the violation, the amount of the fine, recidivism, if any, by the
vendor and the economic circumstances of the vendor.
25
The main issue for the plaintiffs was that the schedule in-
19 Street Vendor Project 1, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 557 (italics added). "In comparison to the first
revised schedule as proposed on October 15, 2004, the Schedule decreases the penalties for a
fourth and fifth violation, by $500 and $250, respectively." Id. at 558. "Among the viola-
tions covered by the new fine schedule are: not having a valid license in clear view of cus-
tomers; failing to have financial records on hand while doing business on the street; failing
to place price tags on merchandise; and failing to offer receipts." See Lueck, supra note 7, at
B6.
20 Street Vendor Project 1, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
21 Id. at 561. "[N]either the rule that ECB promulgated, nor the formulaic statement of
'basis and purpose' that it appended to the published rule, discloses any indication of its rea-
sons or the rule's basis and purpose. . . . A statement that is primarily descriptive, rather
than explanatory, is inadequate." Id.
22 Id. at 562.
23 Street Vendor Project II, 841 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
24 Id. (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998)).
25 Street Vendor Project II, 841 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
4152008]
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creased maximum penalties for street vending offenses from $250 to
$1,000.26 The street vendors argued throughout the litigation that
they are mostly immigrants of limited means, and that the fines con-
stitute an extremely large portion of their business expenses in com-
parison to the potential earnings from their street vending operation.27
The Street Vendor Project argued that its members had received an
average seven tickets in 2004, totaling $3,650 under the new sche-
dule, while only earning $8,400 to live and pay taxes and fines.
28
The extent of the impact is immense considering how easily a police
officer can fine street vendors for regulatory violations, often citing
them for multiple violations on the same day.29 The Street Vendor
Project released a report in 2006 finding "[v]iolations range[ed] from
vending too close to a storefront or too far from the curb, vending on
a restricted street or not having a vending license clearly visible. 3 °
The New York and Federal Excessive Fines Clauses are tex-
tually similar, but substantively variant.3' In scrutinizing the different
doctrinal tests and definitions inherent in excessive fines jurispru-
26 Id.
27 Street Vendor Project I, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 558. See Richardson, supra note 2, at B2
("Most [street vendors] are recent immigrants and speak little English."). See also Bernstein,
supra note 17, at B1.
The hot dog vendor from Bangladesh, the sidewalk watch salesman from
Mauritania, the elderly Peruvian-American woman who had sold hats
downtown for 15 years, all faced an end to their licenses within days be-
cause they could not afford to pay $1,000 for repeated violations like
selling within 20 feet of a doorway.
28 Street Vendor Project I, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
29 See Bernstein, supra note 17, at BI (One street vendor testified that "[s]ome tickets
were because the table was too big .... Some because I was too close to the comer. Some
for being less than 23 feet from the door.").
30 Justin Rocket Silverman, Vendors Not Sold on City's Ticketing, NEWSDAY, Oct. 4,
2006, at A16.
31 Street Vendor Project 1, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
416 [Vol. 24
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 24 [2008], No. 2, Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss2/15
EXCESSIVE FINES
dence, it is instructive to examine certain key distinctions and the de-
velopment of the Excessive Fines Clause at the United States Su-
preme Court level and then analyze its impact on federal circuit court
decisions, and finally compare and contrast these federal circuit court
decisions to New York case law.
"Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding against the property
itself and not its owner.... Criminal forfeiture, on the other hand, is
an in personam proceeding against a defendant who forfeits nothing
unless she is convicted of a crime. 32 As a result, defendants in civil
forfeiture proceedings are afforded fewer rights and constitutional
protections than in criminal forfeiture proceedings.33 Civil forfeiture
is "a concept traceable to biblical text and carried into the Middle
Ages in the form of the law of deodands. ' ,34  Contrastingly,
"[c]riminal forfeiture has its roots in the common law."
35
The United States Supreme Court's most notable articulation
of what constitutes an excessive fine in a civil proceeding comes
from United States v. Bajakajian, with Justice Thomas writing for the
32 Melissa A. Rolland, Comment, Forfeiture Law, the Eighth Amendment's Excessive
Fines Clause, and United States v. Bajakajian, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1371, 1374 (1999)
(emphasis added).
33 Id. "Civil forfeiture almost certainly does not define private rights, and in many cases
seems only to serve as punishment .... In criminal forfeiture cases, courts use a higher bur-
den of proof standard, and more constitutional protections are provided for defendants." Id.
34 Barry L. Johnson, Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Excessive Fines
Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture After United States v. Bajaka-
jian, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 461, 466 (2000). See Rolland, supra note 32, at 1372 ("The.Eng-
lish medieval law of deodand held that when an inanimate object or an animal caused the
death of a person, that object was forfeited .... The law viewed the object as being guilty
itself.").
35 Johnson, supra note 34, at 465. "[A] felon's estate [was prohibited] from passing title
to property, thus depriving the felon's decedents of inheritance not only from the felon but
also from more remote ancestors." Id. at 466.
2008] 417
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majority. 36  In Bajakajian, the defendant, a gas station owner, at-
tempted to board a plane from Los Angeles to Cyprus with his wife
and two daughters without fully reporting the amount of money he
was taking out of the country. 37  After a United States customs in-
spector approached the defendant, informing him the required report-
ing any money he was carrying in excess of $10,000, the defendant
told the customs inspector that that he had $8,000, and that his wife
had another $7,000.38 After a search of the family's luggage revealed
that the defendant was attempting to transport a total of $357,144, the
defendant was taken into custody, and the currency was seized. A
federal grand jury later indicted the defendant on three counts, at is-
36 524 U.S. at 334. "[A] punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is
grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense." Id. "It is interesting that
Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion in Bajakajian because, along with Justice Scalia,
he has concluded that the Eighth Amendment does not require proportionality review of
prison sentences, begging the question, 'Is money different?' " Rachel A. Van Cleave,
"Death Is Different, "Is Money Different? Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive
Damages-Shifting Constitutional Paradigms For Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 217, 253 (2003) (emphasis added). Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined Justice Thomas' majority. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 323-24 (5-4 decision).
"[Justice] Thomas' approach is problematic ... because [of the] many flaws and inconsis-
tencies in originalist jurisprudence and his incomplete grasp of prison history. [Justice]
Thomas' effort to constrain the meaning of the Eighth Amendment has failed to attract the
support of any justices other than [Justice] Scalia." Christopher E. Smith, The Malleability of
Constitutional Doctrine and Its Ironic Impact on Prisoners' Rights, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
73, 78 (2001). Some commentators have posited that Justice Thomas' inconsistent views on
the Eighth Amendment are
a natural outgrowth of his distinctive ideology that values individual re-
sponsibility and condemns moral weakness. The tenor of these opinions,
however, stems at least in part from Thomas's reaction to the irony of
being viewed as a beneficiary of affirmative action at every level of pro-
fessional attainment - most glaringly during his nomination to fill Justice
Thurgood Marshall's seat on the Supreme Court - despite his strong
stance against race-conscious policies.
Note, Lasting Stigma: Affirmative Action and Clarence Thomas's Prisoners' Rights Juri-
sprudence, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1332 (1999).
7 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324.
38 Id. at 324-25.
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sue in the case being count three, the forfeiture of the $357,144. 39
The district court found the defendant's funds were to repay a
lawful debt and were not connected to another crime. 40 The district
court further found the defendant did not report that he was taking
currency outside the United States because he was fearful and dis-
trustful of the government.41 The court held forfeiture of the entire
$357,144 "would be 'extraordinarily harsh' and 'grossly dispropor-
tionate' to the offense in question...2 and ordered that $15,000 of
the currency be forfeited, the defendant sentenced to three years of
probation and a $5,000 fine, the maximum fine under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, as opposed to the statutory maximum of
$250,000 for such a reporting offense.43 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.44
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held
that "a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is
grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense.
4 5
The Court reasoned that a "forfeiture [of the entire $357,144] would
be grossly disproportional to the gravity of his offense. It is larger
than the $5,000 fine imposed by the district court by many orders of
magnitude, and it bears no articulable correlation to any injury suf-
fered by the Government.' 46 The majority emphasized two key con-
" Id. at 325.
40 Id. at 326
41 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
42 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 326.
41 Id. at 325 n.2.
44 Id. at 326; 84 F.3d 334, 335, 340 (9th Cir. 1996).
4' Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334.
46 Id. at 339-40.
2008] 419
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siderations. The first was substantial deference to Congress. The
second was that a "judicial determination regarding the gravity of a..
. criminal offense will be inherently imprecise., 47  This decision
marked a watershed in Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause
jurisprudence. Whereas previous cases failed to define what consti-
tutes an excessive fine, Bajakajian gave lower courts more, albeit still
imprecise, guidance for defining excessiveness.48
Two important predecessor cases to Bajakajian, Austin v.
United States49 and Alexander v. United States,50 were decided on the
same day and provide insight into the reasoning behind the Bajaka-
jian decision. Despite the majority of circuit case law to the contrary,
Austin held the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause go-
verned punitive civil forfeitures. Comparatively, Alexander was able
to separate the Excessive Fines and Cruel and Unusual Punishment
analysis through focusing on criminal forfeiture under the Excessive
Fines Clause.51
In Austin, the defendant's body shop and mobile home were
forfeited to the United States government after state authorities ex-
ecuted a search warrant for the defendant's body shop and mobile
home and found small amounts of drugs, paraphernalia, a handgun,
and approximately $4,700 in cash.52 The United States Supreme
47 Id. at 336.
48 See Johnson, supra note 34, at 479. "In reaching this conclusion, the Court undertook
the task it had deferred in Austin and Alexander and began to lay the foundations of a newly
emerging Excessive Fines Clause jurisprudence." Id. (emphasis added).
49 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
50 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
51 Johnson, supra note 34, at 471.
52 Austin, 509 U.S. at 605.
420 [Vol. 24
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Court held the forfeiture statute at issue did not solely serve a re-
medial purpose because the statute could be construed as serving to
both deter and to punish.53 Most notably, however, the Supreme
Court declined to set forth a test for determining what makes a forfei-
ture constitutionally "excessive," and held instead that it was an ap-
propriate question for the lower courts to consider and determine.54
In Alexander, the defendant was sentenced to six years in
prison, a $100,000 fine, and had to pay for his prosecution, incarcera-
tion, and supervised release after being found guilty of seventeen ob-
scenity offenses and three counts of violating the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").55 The defendant
was also ordered to forfeit his wholesale and retail businesses, includ-
ing the assets, as well as the almost $9 million acquired through rack-
eteering.56  The defendant's vast racketeering operation included
more than a dozen pornography theaters and retail stores, as well as
an interest in ten commercial properties, and thirty-one other busi-
nesses. 57  The Supreme Court ultimately held the defendant's pu-
nishment for his offense should have been analyzed under the Exces-
sive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution.58 Further, as in Austin, the Court declined to answer the
53 The Austin Court explained that because the legislative intent of the statute was to deter
and punish drug related offenses, the statute served more than a remedial purpose. Thus, it
was "subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause." Id. at
621-22.
14 Id. at 622-23. "Prudence dictates that we allow the lower courts to consider that ques-
tion in the first instance." Id.
" 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962 (West 2000); Austin, 509 U.S. at 546, 548.
56 Alexander, 509 U.S. at 548.
7 Id. at 546, 548.
58 Id. at 559.
2008]
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question of whether or not the defendant's fine was excessive.59
Comparatively, the state appellate division in the instant case
applied the "gross disproportionality" test that the United States Su-
preme Court articulated in Bajakajian, but used a "multitude of fac-
tors" approach in determining whether a fine is excessive under the
New York State Constitution.60 As the New York Court of Appeals
enunciated in County of Nassau v. Canavan,61 New York
consider[s] such factors as the seriousness of the of-
fense, the severity of the harm caused and of the po-
tential harm had the defendant not been caught, the
relative value of the forfeited property and the maxi-
mum punishment to which defendant could have been
subject for the crimes charged, and the economic cir-
cumstances of the defendant.62
In Canavan, the defendant was arrested for driving while in-
toxicated, speeding, and failing to signal.63 The defendant's car was
seized after her arrest, and she was given notice that her automobile
may be forfeited to Nassau County. The County later commenced a
civil forfeiture action after the defendant demanded her car back.64
The Court of Appeals held the Nassau County ordinance under which
the defendant's car was seized was not unconstitutionally vague be-
cause it "ma[de] clear what conduct may lead to forfeiture of an in-
59 Id. ("We think it preferable that this question be addressed by the Court of Appeals in
the first instance.").
60 Street Vendor Project II, 841 N.Y.S.2d at 80 (quoting Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334).
61 802 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 2003).
62 Canavan, 802 N.E.2d at 622.
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strumentality of a crime., 65 The court concluded the forfeiture was
not disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. 66 The court rea-
soned that driving while intoxicated is a serious offense, and that if
defendant had not been stopped, an innocent victim could have been
seriously injured or killed from defendant's speeding and weaving in
and out of lanes with a blood alcohol level of .15 percent.67 The
court also stated in dicta that "the forfeiture of an automobile for a
minor traffic infraction such as driving with a broken taillight or fail-
ing to signal would ... be 'grossly disproportional to the gravity of a
defendant's offense.' ,68
In re MitchelP9 is also instructive in determining what New
York deems to be an excessive fine under the New York State Con-
stitution. In Mitchell, the defendant was sanctioned for administra-
tive violations by the New York City Department of Consumer Af-
fairs for selling merchandise outside of his newsstand and for taking
up an area on the sidewalk greater than seventy-two square feet.70
After the city fined the defendant $600 and revoked his vendor li-
cense, he continued to operate his newsstand without a license, and
was cited twice for these infractions-the second time resulted in the
city padlocking his newsstand. 7  After the defendant made a good
65 Id. at 621. "The ordinance defines an instrumentality of a crime as any property, other
than real property and any buildings, fixtures, appurtenances, and improvements thereon,
whose use contributes directly and materially to the commission of any offense." Id. at 620
(quotations omitted).
66 Canavan, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
67 Id.
68 Id. (quoting Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334).
69 554 N.Y.S.2d 151 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1990).
70 In re Mitchell, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
71 Id. at 152-53.
2008] 423
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faith effort to pursue administrative remedies, the court held "as an
exception to the doctrine of administrative finality," that the sanction-
ing court's decision to padlock the defendant's newsstand was not an
abuse of discretion, even though it had only levied fines upon the de-
fendant on two prior occasions.72
Further, in Griffith v. Aponte,7 3 the appellate division, while
not articulating a clear test for excessive fines under New York's
constitution, stated it was an excessive penalty where the plaintiff, a
licensed process server, was charged $350 for each of twenty-three
charges of misconduct (totaling $8,050) and had his process server
license revoked.74 The misconduct mostly entailed deficiencies in
record-keeping compliance and inaccurate logbook entries as to the
details of service of process. The court held that a severe monetary
penalty amounting to almost half of what the petitioner made annual-
ly as a process server, coupled with a revocation of his process server
license, was "shocking to one's sense of fairness. 75 The court re-
manded the defendant's case, imposed a $500 fine and limited the re-
vocation of his license to a period not to exceed one year.76
To effectively compare and contrast the United States Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the Federal Constitution's excessive
fines clause to New York's interpretation of the state constitution's
excessive fines clause, it is important to emphasize some of the key
72 Id. at 153. The doctrine of administrative finality employs an "abuse of discretion stan-
dard." Id.
7' 506 N.Y.S.2d 167 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1986).
74 Griffith, 506 N.Y.S.2d 167 at 167-68.
75 Id. at 168 (quoting In rePell, 313 N.E.2d 321, 326 (N.Y. 1974)).
76 Id. at 168.
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deficiencies in the United State's Supreme Court's case law. The
main criticism of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Excessive
Fines Clause is its limited guidance for lower federal courts on when
to label a fine or forfeiture "excessive. 77 Courts need to issue deci-
sions that are more in-depth, comprehensive and uniform, allowing
for equality and predictability in future cases.78 Some commentators
have noted that "[t]his lack of clarity leads to unpredictability and
uncertainty both for government prosecutors seeking to comport with
the constitutional mandates and defendants seeking to invoke legiti-
mate constitutional protections. 79 One commentator has posited that
the Supreme Court's lack of guidance on this issue has led to "the
circuit courts develop[ing] three different tests to determine whether
a forfeiture is excessive." 80 These tests are: (1) the instrumentality
test;81 (2) the proportionality test;
82 and (3) a hybrid of the two.8 3
77 Matthew C. Solomon, Note, The Perils of Minimalism: United States v. Bajakajian in
the Wake of the Supreme Court's Civil Double Jeopardy Excursion, 87 GEO. L.J. 849, 854
(1999). "This lack of guidance results in confusion and uncertainty in the lower courts....
Moreover, it wastes judicial resources because lower courts must engage in a 'guessing
game' about how the Court will eventually rule." Id.
78 See id. at 870.
'9 Id. at 876.
80 Rolland, supra note 32, at 1385.
81 Rolland, supra note 32, at 1385. "To be constitutional under the instrumentality test,
the property forfeited must have a close enough relationship to the crime that the property is
deemed an instrumentality of the crime and is therefore rendered guilty." Id. "The question
is not how much the confiscated property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has
a close enough relation to the offense." Austin, 509 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., concurring).
82 Rolland, supra note 32, at 1386. This test first compares the "gravity of the offense"
with "the harshness of the punishment. In the second step, the punishment imposed is com-
pared to punishments imposed for crimes with relatively the same gravity of offense. [The
last] step compares the punishment given to punishments for the same offense in different
jurisdictions." Id.
83 Rolland, supra note 32, at 1388.
The first prong of the test, the instrumentality prong, requires the Gov-
emnment to show a "substantial connection between the property, or the
appropriate portion thereof, and the offense." If the Government can
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Justice Kennedy's vehement dissent in Bajakajian also
84echoed some of these key criticisms. Justice Kennedy criticized the
majority for "confus[ing] whether a fine is excessive with whether it
is a punishment"85 and operating under the incorrect assumption that
in personam forfeitures were "limited to reimbursing the Government
for unpaid duties. 86 While he agreed there should be deference to
Congress, Justice Kennedy was critical of the majority's application
in this case.87 Further, the dissent expressed concern regarding the
impact of the majority's opinion on the government's ability to deter
serious money laundering activities.88 The dissent argued that "[b]y
invoking the Excessive Fines Clause with excessive zeal, the majority
may in the long run encourage Congress to circumvent it."
89
In comparing and contrasting the federal and state excessive
fines case law, whether or not a civil forfeiture that serves as punish-
ment is excessive is a fact-sensitive inquiry that varies by jurisdic-
tion, especially at the federal circuit court level-a likely product of
the Supreme Court's lack of guidance on what constitutes an exces-
sive forfeiture. A federal circuit court's interpretation of Bajaka-
show this connection, the burden then shifts to the defendant to "show
that forfeiture of his property would be grossly disproportionate given
the nature and extent of his criminal culpability."
Id. (quoting United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 1995)).
" Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 344 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("For the first time in its history,
the Court strikes down a fine as excessive under the Eighth Amendment.").
85 Id. at 345.
86 Id. at 346 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
87 Id. at 348 ("The majority's assessment of the crime accords no deference, let alone sub-
stantial deference, to the judgment of Congress. Congress deems the crime serious, but the
Court does not.").
" Id. at 354. "[T]he average forfeiture per dollar smuggled could amount, courtesy of
today's decision, to far less than 5% .... [Tihe fine . . . would be a modest cost of doing
business in the world of drugs and crime." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
426 [Vol. 24
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jian's holding varies based on the court's level of emphasis on the
statutory scheme for forfeiture and the gravity of the offense com-
pared to the gravity of the harm. For example, in Qwest Corporation
v. Minnesota Public Utilities Commission,90 the Eighth Circuit held
that $25.95 million in fines issued by a state public utility commis-
sion against a telecommunications company for violating certain pro-
visions of the Federal Telecommunications Act were not excessive.
91
The Eighth Circuit considered Bajakajian's "grossly disproportio-
nate" standard in terms of "legislative intent and the gravity of the of-
fense relative to the fine., 92 The court reasoned the fine was not ex-
cessive because the "amounts [of the penalties were] well within the
statutory limits and [were] consistent with the general statutory
scheme." 93 Further, the court stated
"[t]he penalty amount [was] also not excessive in
light of the gravity of the harm caused by Qwest's
failure to file [an Interconnection Agreement with the
Minnesota Public Utility Counsel for other local car-
riers to access] .... This failure affected the state reg-
ulatory body, the competitive environment in Minne-
sota, and ... [those] that were not parties to these
agreements. 94
Comparatively, the Eleventh Circuit held in United States v.
817 N.E. 29th Drive,95 that it was not an excessive fine where the
89 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 355 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
9' 427 F.3d 1061 (8th Cir. 2005).
91 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); Qwest, 427 F.3d at 1063
92 Id. at 1069.
93 Id.
Id. at 1063, 1069-70.
9 175 F.3d 1304 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
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government seized two parcels of the defendant's land after the de-
fendant was convicted in state court of drug possession and drug traf-
ficking.96 The court reasoned the fine was not excessive because it
fell within the maximum statutory penalty and within the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.97 Further, the court refused to consider that
the forfeited property was the defendant's personal residence in its
excessive fines analysis because "excessiveness is determined in rela-
tion to the characteristics of the offense, not in relation to the charac-
teristics of the offender."98  However, other federal circuit courts
have placed more emphasis on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
than on the statutory scheme at issue. In United States v. Beras,99 the
First Circuit found a forfeiture of $138,794 for failing to report trans-
porting money outside of the United States in excess of $10,000, con-
stituted an excessive fine based on similar considerations to those the
Bajakajian Court used. 100 The First Circuit interpreted "Bajakajian.
[to] suggest[] that the maximum penalties provided under the
Guidelines should be given greater weight than the statute because
the Guidelines take into consideration the culpability of the individu-
al defendant," and therefore, the $30,000 penalty under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines is the amount that is taken into consideration
96 Id. at 1307.
9' Id. at 1309-11.
98 Id. at 1311. "The Supreme Court ... has made clear that whether a forfeiture is 'exces-
sive' is determined by comparing the amount of the forfeiture to the gravity of the offense."
Id.
99 183 F.3d22 (lstCir. 1999).
100 Id. at 24. The court considered "(1) that Beras's violation was not related to any other
illegal activities; (2) other penalties that Congress has authorized for Beras's crimes as well
as the maximum penalty provided by the Sentencing Guidelines; and (3) the extent of the
harm caused by Beras's actions." Id. at 29.
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of whether or not a fine is excessive, and not the $250,000 maximum
fine authorized by Congress. 0 1
Contrastingly, New York uses a "multitude of factors test"
that is extremely fact-sensitive. 10 2 New York interprets an excessive
fine more broadly than the federal courts and thus does not place as
much emphasis on the amount dictated by the applicable statute.
New York is also more sympathetic to the impact of the potential fine
on the defendant. In Street Vendor Project II, the appellate division
reasoned that the appropriate test for whether or not a fine, in the con-
text of street vending, is excessive took into account a broad range of
factors articulated in Canavan.10 3 In Canavan, the court considered
the maximum penalty for driving while intoxicated in determining
whether forfeiture of a defendant's car was an excessive fine, and al-
so looked at the "seriousness of the offense, the severity of the harm
caused and of the potential harm had the defendant not been caught,
the relative value of the forfeited property . . . and the economic cir-
cumstances of the defendant."'' 0 4 Further, Mitchell placed great em-
phasis on the fine's ability to dissuade recidivism of a statutory viola-
tion,' O5 while Griffith was highly sympathetic to the fine in relation to
the amount of the defendant's income, as well as its impact on the de-
fendant's ability to earn a living.
1 6
10' Id. at 29 n.5.
102 Street Vendor Project II, 841 NYS.2d at 80.
103 Id.
104 Canavan, 802 N.E.2d at 622.
1"5 In re Mitchell, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 153. "Having failed to dissuade petitioner from com-
mitting the same infractions by levying fines on two prior occasions, respondent's decision
to revoke his license cannot be said to be an abuse of discretion." Id.
106 "[T]he severe economic sanction imposed (amounting to approximately half of peti-
tioner's annual income as a process server) coupled with revocation of his [process server]
2008] 429
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Given the inconsistent views and fact-sensitive nature evident
in the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal
Constitution's Excessive Fines Clause and New York's interpretation
of the excessive fines clause under the New York Constitution, it is
difficult to predict how future courts at both the state and federal lev-
el will rule on what constitutes an excessive fine. The evolution of
case law in a jurisdiction appears to be a largely determinative factor
in deciding whether a fine is excessive.
In Street Vendor Project II, however, the solution to the dis-
pute between New York City and the street vendors resulting from
the increased penalty schedule lies less in how the law defines "ex-
cessive" and more in how the law views the social value of a street
vendor. In short, the answer to the street vendor's plight lies less in
the law and more in sociology.
10 7
license is 'shocking to one's sense of fairness' and therefore unlawful." Griffith, 506
N.Y.S.2d at 168 (quoting In re Pell, 313 N.E.2d at 326).
107 See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 31-32
(1961).
The first thing to understand is that public peace - the sidewalk and
street peace - of cities is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as
police are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious, net-
work of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves,
and enforced by the people themselves.
See also James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neigh-
borhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 31. The "broken windows theory" can
be explained as follows:
[I]f a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest
of the windows will soon be broken. This is as true in nice neighbor-
hoods as in run-down ones. Window-breaking does not necessarily oc-
cur on a large scale because some areas are inhabited by determined
window-breakers whereas others are populated by window-lovers; ra-
ther, one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so
breaking more windows costs nothing. (It has always been fun.)
See also MITCHELL DUNEIER, SIDEWALK 315 (1999) proposing a
"fixed windows theory," which explicitly follows the "broken windows"
logic in reverse. When the government abdicates its responsibility to
430 [Vol. 24
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[W]e have become accustomed to thinking of the law
in essentially individualistic terms. The law defines
my rights, punishes his behavior, and is applied by that
officer because of this harm. We assume, in thinking
this way, that what is good for the individual will be
good for the community, and what doesn't matter
when it happens to one person won't matter if it hap-
pens to many.
0 8
When society is ready to consider a street vendor's value to a
community's safety0 9 and local economy,"0 the law will follow.
In the meantime, while the street vendors of New York City
are waiting for the law to catch up to societal values, there are key
compromises that street vendors and local government entities, such
as Business Improvement Districts ("BIDs"), can reach in order to
curtail the number of violations a street vendor incurs. Among them
are BIDs placing fewer planters on city sidewalks and installing per-
manent vending tables with benches, making it more feasible for
street vendors to operate and have more space to comply with city
regulations."' Although the present legal dispute has been finalized,
help persons who come out of prison to find homes and jobs, such per-
sons are left to their own devises if they are to transform themselves into
persons that make a contribution to society. Some behavior that appears
disorderly to the casual observer is actually bringing about community
controls, rather than leading to their breakdown.
108 Wilson and Kelling, supra note 107, at 36.
109 See DUNEIER, supra note 107, at 316-17.
[O]rder is a by-product of a system of social regulations that is grounded
in an understanding of city life in its uneasy complexity. Cities should
not establish too rigorous standards for pedestrian congestion, and judges
should be careful of efforts to use pedestrian congestion as an excuse to
eliminate vendors from high-rent districts.
"0 See id. at 317. "It is vital to the well-being of cities with extreme poverty that there be
opportunities for those on the edge to engage in self-directed entrepreneurial activity."
111 See id. "Business Improvement Districts must understand that the informal economic
2008]
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the issue will undoubtedly be re-litigated when new fines go into ef-
fect.
Sarah Marx
and social life has great value and need not be aesthetically pleasing." Id. Sean Basinski, of
the Urban Justice Center, has stated that "[t]he hypocrisy is that the same people who are
complaining about vendors taking up space, are taking up space with illegal planters ...
[a]nd the city turns a blind eye." Denny Lee, Neighborhood Report: SoHo; A Modest Touch
of Green Makes Vendors See Red, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2003, at 5.
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DUE PROCESS
United States Constitution Amendment XIV:
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ....
New York Constitution article I, section 6:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.
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